Introduction
The Netherlands introduced a more policy-oriented form of programme budgeting in 2001. The initial aim of this budget reform was to provide Parliament with a more transparent budget document. During the implementation process, the objective broadened to encompass improving the efficiency of programmes.
As a result of this reform, the new structure of the budget is clearer, with strategic objectives and links to related policy areas. Regarding efficiency, however, the results are less evident. There is still a lack of clarity about the contribution of government programmes to policy objectives. In many cases, performance indicators "hit the target but miss the point" and evaluation research does not review the effects of policy. The twofold aim of budget reform -transparency and efficiency -cannot be achieved by one instrument, the budget. The budget should be used for discussion of the main political issues, but other instruments such as policy reviews are advised for facilitating efficiency improvements.
Further work lies ahead on improving the focus and accessibility of budget documents and using policy reviews to achieve improvements in efficiency.
This country report about programme budgeting is built around four pillars (shown as A through D in Table 1 ). At the end of this study, an Annex explains some typical characteristics of the Dutch budgetary process. A. Transparency and efficiency.
A. The policy director is responsible for the budget. Responsibility -being held accountable within a decentralised administrative organisation -provides an incentive for efficient use of resources.
B. Budget bill(s) and memorandum are policy/goal oriented (VBTB begun in the 1990s).
B. Transparency. B. Main policy programmes are presented in a separate chapter of the budget (bill and memorandum). Line articles are formulated in terms of operational goals. Some operational goals are accompanied by performance indicators.
C. Interdepartmental policy reviews (in the 1980s). Obligatory cost-benefit analyses for special projects in the 2000s.
C. Efficiency. C. Independent chair, scientists and specialists are brought in and a report is made public (to Parliament). Policy reviews on level of policy goals. Independent Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), for macroeconomic assumptions (transparency).
D. The way ahead D. Transparency and efficiency.
D. Focus the budget (a core instrument for authorisation) on transparency. Use policy reviews (other instrument) for efficiency.
Programme budgeting
In the 1980s and 1990s, two major reforms were introduced: the Accounting System Operation (Operatie Comptabel Bestel), carried out from 1985 to 1993; and the Policy Budgets and Policy Accountability operation (VBTB, Van Beleidsbegroting tot Beleidsverantwoording), started in 1999.
The Accounting System Operation was conducted against the 1980s background of continuous overruns of expenditures, high deficits and a heavy tax burden. The reform sought to reverse this trend through a broad package of measures: decentralisation, more weight on commitments in accounting (see Box 1) and orderly financial management. The focus was on controlling government expenditures, especially unexpected budget overruns.
In the Netherlands the new budget is programme-based (a combination of programme and resources). 1 Up until the 1980s, policy directors were responsible for their policies, and the control directorate (FEZ) 2 was responsible for the resources ("money"). After the Accounting System Operation, policy directors were responsible for both: programmes and the use of resources. Budget infrastructure and individual accountability are now in line with each other. The advantage of programme budgeting is that (in most cases) only one policy directorate is responsible for a budget line. In giving a policy directorate responsibility over a budget line, it becomes easier for a line minister to make an agreement (with a director) on the policy goals to be reached with this amount of money. In addition, budget overruns/windfalls are managed (according to the fiscal rules) by the responsible policy directorate. This means first of all giving information about a possible overrun to the line minister and the Ministry of Finance and, second, a policy decision on the way this overrun is solved (i.e. a proposal for a budget cut).
Box 1. Accounting base of the budget in the Netherlands
To strengthen the budgetary power of Parliament, the budget administrative system (budget bills and reports for ministries and budget funds) in the Netherlands is both cash and commitment based. This is made visible due to the link between commitments and cash payments. The budget contains a multi-annual forecast (unchanged policy and unchanged prices; forecast for 2008-11 in 2007 prices) . Parliament approves the budget for one year: policy decisions about how much to allocate for each goal. One line minister is responsible for one budget line. Control (over the decision whether to invest in the first place) can best be exercised "up front" when the government commits itself to the full cash outlays. Possible benefits must be presented in supplementary policy documents (cost-benefit analysis).
Because orderly financial management is an absolute condition for the successful control of government expenditures, the budget infrastructure was reviewed. A framework for central and decentralised (financial) information provision had been lacking, and so a rapid flow of information had to be established between the Ministry of Finance and the spending ministries. A computerised interdepartmental budget consultation system for the entire state budget was set up (see Box A.3 in the Annex). It was vital to have better co-operation between the line ministries and the Ministry of Finance. The budget information exchange between the government and Parliament was upgraded. For example, the report/account was presented nine months after the budget execution year (in contrast, the report of 1978 was presented in 1985).
After the Accounting System Operation reform, financial management innovations continued. A new form of internal autonomy was introduced (agencies) to improve managerial flexibility. Policy Budgets and Policy Accountability (VBTB) evolved from the operations of the 1980s as logical instruments to increase legitimacy and manageability of government spending. After an intensive preparation process, the new budget of 2002 (September 2001) became more policy oriented.
Programme budgeting is policy oriented
The VBTB operation (i.e. new budget) was aimed at providing Parliament with a more policy-oriented and transparent budget document: clear information about the results of government actions. Because the new budget enables the government to focus on policy objectives (results of programmes) instead of instruments, the budget reform is also significant for efficiency. This operation was developed at the initiative of the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament. The Ministry of Finance played a role of co-ordination and monitoring. After an intensive preparation process, all ministries switched to the new budgetary structure during the budget preparations for 2002 ("big boom").
As its point of departure, the new-style budget would not take funds to be spent, but rather policy and its concrete objectives. The crux of the matter is to make the political objectives in the coalition agreement 3 clear in the underlying budget bills and (in retrospect) reports. The focus is on questions such as: What do we want to achieve? What will we do to achieve it? What will we allow it to cost? The new style of budget was accompanied by a new style of accounting -the annual report -in which the layout was the mirror image of the budget: Did we achieve what we intended? Did we do what we meant to do to achieve it? Did it cost what we thought it would? (See Box 2.)
In September 2006, the new-style budget (memorandum and bills) was presented to the Lower House for the sixth time. The operation was not painless; it took much time and effort. Therefore it is only to be expected that the Policy Budgets and Policy Accountability objectives would not be achieved within six budget cycles. Where do matters stand now?
The new structure of the budget is clearer. New budgets are built around strategic objectives and related policy areas. Substantial progress regarding transparency (authorisation) has been achieved. There has been a reduction in the number of line items by more than 75% (from around 800 to around 200 line items). 4 Also the "old" explanatory statement has been greatly condensed, and the introduction of each budget bill (explaining the policy priorities) is more political. Last but not least, accounting takes place four months earlier than it did before the introduction of the new budget.
Despite these improvements, there are still some challenges to overcome. The budget bills are thick (a high degree of overlap with information in policy documents) and hard to read (budget bills contain a lot of technical information, for example about cost prices). Appendices -containing primarily technical and detailed tables and information on the conduct of business -account for over 20% of the number of pages of a budget. Information about the contribution of government programmes to policy objectives is unclear. Objectives are formulated in such abstract terms that it is impossible to determine (in retrospect) whether they have been achieved. There is a natural tendency of officials and administrators to hedge their bets and give veiled answers. In 2004 there was a review of the second-level legislation 5 on reliability of policy information. The "order on performance data" (RPE) stipulates how spending/line ministries should prepare performance indicators and targets for their strategic and operational objectives. (Note that spending/line ministries are responsible for their own budget, and therefore for their own performance data.) The criteria that were stated in the "order on performance data" (validity, reliability and usefulness) have proved to be inadequate (see Box 3).
Quantitative performance data can hit the target but miss the point in a lot of cases. 6 There is a huge focus on the measurability of objectives, at the expense of quality (see Box 4). Among the unintended effects, reality may be represented too simply, or management may be driven by inappropriate performance targets (the number of fines does not say anything about how safe the motorway is; and the number of students who graduate does not say anything about the know-how/expertise of students).
Much important research relevant to policy is done by planning agencies, universities and other research institutes. This research is frequently used in the policy preparation process. On the other hand, the state of affairs in recorded evaluations is fairly gloomy. A great deal of evaluation research takes place (more than 250 evaluations -mostly ex post -are executed each year), but it does not review the effects of policy. The evaluation research presents interviews, perceptions, opinions and customer satisfaction. The ideal of the "order on performance data" -to improve efficiency with scientific researchis beyond reach. Scientific research can only be conducted if there is a counterfactual (no-policy option), which is almost never the case. Hardly any research is future oriented except for some very useful cost-benefit analyses for special projects (like the Amsterdam South Axis) or jetfighters (Joint Strike Fighter). Cost-benefit analyses for special central government (infrastructure) projects are obligatory since 2000.
The Netherlands budget memorandum gives an overview of the main political initiatives against the background of economic development. The targets of main policy programmes and major achievements of policies are reported in a separate chapter. In the 2007 budget memorandum, there were seven main policy programmes: social and economic policy; youth; education, knowledge and innovation; safety; health; environment and transport; and international policy and defence. Each policy issue is subdivided into several targets (see Box 6). These targets are of course geared to the objectives in the policy bills of each line ministry. The "tuning" process is a joint task of the Inspectorate of the Budget of the Ministry of Finance and the control division of the line ministry.
Box 5. New-style budget and conclusions of the International Monetary Fund
The IMF has published a report on the observance of standards and codes on fiscal transparency for the Netherlands (IMF, 2006) . The new budgets are a reform with potential for improving transparency, accountability and allocation of decision making. Much work has been done, but the harvest still has to be reaped (mostly). Performance information needs to be limited and focused. The IMF suggests using information appropriate to the level of discussion (main issues), to better integrate policy analysis in the budget cycle, and to raise the quality and independence of policy assessments.
Major (quantitative and qualitative) achievements per policy area are also mentioned in the budget memorandum. In the area of social and economic policy, for example, these include the reduction of the corporate tax from 34.5% to 25.5%, the reduction of the bureaucracy ("red tape") for citizens and entrepreneurs by 25%, and the reform of the Social Assistance Act (Bijstand), the Unemployment Act (WW) and the Disablement Act (WAO). But other achievements include a reduction of school drop-outs by 20% since 2002, a reduction of criminality by 10%, the dismantlement of 5 600 marijuana production facilities, and the employment of around 5 100 armed forces in international operations.
The budget reform (transparency) and legislation on policy information (efficiency) melted into each other. Both initiatives expressed themselves through the budget. The general conclusion is that the twofold aim of reform for transparency and efficiency cannot be achieved by one instrument, the budget. The phrase should be "one goal, one instrument". A different, more limited, form of presentation is needed for the budget, to make it easier for those who are politically responsible to read it. Enormous quantities of figures can simply be weeded out. Efficiency must be improved by encouraging rigorous ex ante and ex post evaluation.
Interdepartmental policy reviews
The Netherlands -like many other countries -is in a continuing struggle to spend taxpayers' money in a more efficient and effective manner. Since the 1970s, several initiatives have been carried out, like the Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS: programme budgeting, performance budgeting, and multi-annual budgeting), the reconsideration procedure (1981) and the development of interdepartmental policy reviews from 1995. • Reduction of waiting lists for youth care and bureaucracy.
• Deal with youth criminality.
Safety
• Reduction in criminality of 20-25% in the period 2008-10 (basic value 2002).
• "More blue on the street" -40 000 extra prosecutions at the Counsel for Prosecution.
• More prison cells.
• Fight against terrorism and protection of vital infrastructure.
An important reason for new initiatives to improve efficiency was the "Dutch disease" which occurred in the Netherlands during the 1970s. "Dutch disease" is the international phrase to describe the economic problems due to the use of temporary higher government revenues for structural government outlays. As a consequence, other economic activities are pushed out and government finances become unsustainable (see Figure 1) .
During the 1970s, setback followed setback and the cutbacks had no real influence. The government of the time introduced a "posterity procedure". All ministries had to identify a certain percentage of the total budget which was not vital. De facto, only a few ministries answered the request, so it failed.
Since 1981, the reconsideration procedure successfully triggered discussions about the policy option itself ("large efficiency") rather than discussions about operational management within the policy option ("small efficiency"). The main goal is to separate the objective analysis/conclusions from the (political) policy conclusions by splitting the review from the opinion or recommendations of the Cabinet regarding the review. Both the review and the Cabinet opinion are sent to Parliament (see Box 7).
The reconsideration procedure was already in place in 1975. During the first years, the results were disappointing. Several policy areas escaped review. This "escape hatch" was closed by the 1981 budget memorandum, when 30 subjects were chosen for reconsideration and thus all policy areas were taken into account.
Also in the beginning of the 1970s, the Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) was introduced, but failed partly. The PPBS consists of three elements: programme budgeting, performance budgeting and multi-annual Figure 1 . Budget balance in the Netherlands during the 1970s 1 -3 -7 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 EMU deficit (per cent of GDP)
budgeting. Only the multi-annual estimations of budget items (t + 1 through t + 4) were successful. Outlays of programmes after the budget year (t) are now recorded, so underestimations are prevented and mid-term savings are transparent. Programme budgeting failed mainly due to an aversion to the highly theoretical approach. Goals were defined in a top-down manner and not in line with the organisational structure (budget responsibilities of policy directorates).
The reconsideration procedure of 1981 (de facto 1975) forms the basis for the current system of programme reviews (interdepartmental policy reviews, or IBOs, from 1995). Under this system, policy reviews are conducted with the purpose of developing alternatives that would yield savings -preferably based on efficiency measures but, if necessary, based on a reduction of service levels. Only alternatives that cost the same or less can be considered. Each review has to produce at least one alternative that would lead to a 20% reduction of expenditure after four years compared to the current estimate of the last out-year. In the 1990s, the reconsideration procedure was gradually adapted to changing economic circumstances. The mandatory 20% savings alternative was abolished (due to pressure from the spending/line ministries) and reviews have become focused on institutional changes (see Box 8).
Box 7. Main characteristics of the reconsideration procedure
• Checks and balances (chaired by the line ministry; secretariat by the Ministry of Finance; the Inspectorate of the Budget is also a member).
• Each review should produce alternatives that should lead to a 20% reduction of expenditure after four years.
• No veto right (to prevent the entry of minority views).
• Uniform structure of the review and standard questions (like a description of policy, objectives and instruments, etc.).
Box 8. Procedural and organisational aspects of the interdepartmental policy reviews
• Policy reviews are proposed for review by the Ministry of Finance.
• The proposals for policy reviews are approved by Cabinet, so also by the line ministries. Line ministries have to co-operate. A list of proposed policy reviews is included in the September budget memorandum.
• The reviews are conducted by small working groups with representation from the Ministry of Finance, the line ministries, and external experts.
• The chair is independent and the secretariat is provided by the Ministry of Finance or shared with the line ministry.
• All reports are made public and submitted to Parliament.
An example of rigorous analysis and more efficient policy is the reform of the welfare benefits or Social Assistance Act (Bijstand). There was a perception that too many people were relying on benefits while still being able to work. The independent Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) took up the challenge and made an assessment of the Social Assistance Act. As a result of this assessment, an interdepartmental policy review was initiated by the Ministry of Finance (see Box 9).
Box 9. Example of a successful interdepartmental policy review
Triggered by studies of the independent Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) at the end of the 1990s, a range of labour market redesign measures enabled substantial budgetary reductions. One of the results is the reform of the disability schemes (WIA). Another example of successful policy review was conducted in the field of social benefits (Bijstand). In an effort to make social benefits more cost effective, less complex and more aligned with decentralised responsibility (budgeting), the basis for this interdepartmental policy review was laid down by a CPB study (Review Memorandum 119) in 1995.
The interdepartmental working group worked out several variants for financing the social benefits by local authorities. These variants were sent to Parliament, together with the Cabinet's point of view. The Cabinet opinion (January 1997) was positive, but more research was needed. 
Demand-driven reform
Financial responsibility (obligation to work and need to prevent fraud) for social assistance went to the municipalities instead of the central government. The new Act incorporates a financial incentive for municipalities to reduce the numbers of workless social assistance claimers.
The incentive is created by dividing the central budget for benefits between the municipalities on the basis of a set of objective parameters (inhabitants, income, etc.). The municipalities that get claimants to (re)enter the labour market will spend less than expected. They can keep the surplus and spend it on their own priorities. Municipalities that are not successful and that have a gap in their budgets must finance the gap from their own resources. For each year that the total amount of unemployed diminishes, the total state budget will be reduced. The majority of the municipalities responded positively to the changes introduced by the Act. They welcomed the decentralisation and delegation of responsibilities. They were allowed to establish closer contact with the unemployed and hence devise tailor-made measures for them. Deregulation provided opportunities for the municipalities to draft their own guidelines within the framework defined by national law.
In the 1990s, the Government Account Act was changed, to give the Court of Audit a role regarding the efficiency of programmes. Ministries were obliged to evaluate policy areas once every five years. Second-level legislation (the "order on performance data" or RPE) was introduced in 2002 to provide rules for the realisation and collection (process) of policy information, like performance indicators and evaluations. The main goals of introducing the "order on performance data" were to guarantee the evaluation function within the central government, and to guarantee that the policy information would be collected for the budget and that the annual report meets the applicable quality requirements.
The way ahead
Further work lies ahead on improving the focus and accessibility of budget documents. The budget should be used for discussion on the main political issues. Budgets should perform their basic task: authorisation of line items (objectives) and control. An easily accessible budget has a clear structure and uses the appropriate information for the level of discussion. More technical information about the plausible relation between performance indicators, operational objectives, instruments and resources is best accommodated in policy documents, not in the budget (see Box 10).
Box 10. How to achieve a more transparent budget
In the Netherlands, the following activities aim to improve the accessibility of the budget:
Civil servants are trained to ask the right questions, write well-structured policy letters/ memos, and conduct policy reviews. The course (run by the National Academy for Finances and Economy, www.rijksacademie.nl) lasts two days. On the first day, a (real) case study is presented by a specialist. He/she describes the process, the difficulties of drafting the memoranda, etc. During the day the students will make (by themselves) a "checklist" with questions whose answers should be found in the budget documents. The second day starts with a "checklist" distributed by the academy; this list is compounded by specialists. At the end of day two, the students will receive a new case study, but now they have to draw up a budget document by themselves (within a time limit).
New technology (like Internet) is used to simplify the budget. For example, very detailed and technical information about government guarantees is accessible on the budget website (www.rijksbegroting.nl/garanties). This means that the information in the budget can be reduced to a general table.
The "order on performance data" was revised. Only process criteria are enclosed. Performance indicators are no longer obligatory, unless they are useful.
A "cup final" is held for the best policy line. Each year the interdepartmental financial affairs directorates elect the best policy line. In 2007, the Ministry of Social Affairs won the cup for its policy line "income protection and activation for disabled people" (article 34) of the budget bill of the Ministry of Social Affairs (see www.rijksbegroting.nl).
To facilitate efficiency improvement, instruments other than the budget are advised. Policy documents are the best instrument to input information about rigorous analysis (ex ante evaluation) into the budget process. In these documents, basic questions should be answered, like what is the problem and what is the role of the government (see Box 11).
There is also a movement towards more efficiency. The point of departure for well-founded policy initiatives is rigorous analysis (ex ante evaluation).
This means that the basic but fundamental questions should be addressed Box 11. Basic questions to be answered in the policy documents
To conduct policy reviews, it is essential that all policy areas are treated equally. In the long term, all policy areas should be reviewed. This means that the questions for assessing the areas should be uniform.
Analysis of the problem
What is the problem to be solved? Which goals can be formulated for the intended policy? What is the cause of the problem?
Role of the government
Why is the solution to the problem a responsibility of the (central) government? Is it market failure or are there external effects?
Possible solutions
Which alternative solutions to the problem are possible? Which instruments can be used (subsidy, tax, guarantee, benefit, etc.)? Are the government expenditures necessary, or is a solution possible in the sphere of law? 
Policy effects of the alternatives

Maintenance
Which steps should be taken to evaluate the policy?
with the help of independent experts and that the outcome of the review is made public. It is essential to concentrate policy reviews (ex post) on the analysis of these basic questions, on the level of strategic objectives and policy areas. In these analyses the basic questions about the foundation of new policies are answered.
Policy review works in practice (www.minfin.nl/nl/onderwerpen,diversen/ beleidsonderzoeken). In 2006, some 17 policy evaluations were conducted in several areas, such as: consumer policy, aid to victims, labour and care, and security in public transport. Seven policy evaluations have been sent to Parliament, five are near completion, and five are delayed. The overall budget for these 17 policy areas is EUR 5 billion. For 2007, 35 policy evaluations are planned (in areas like reintegration and promotion of international commerce) with an overall budget value of EUR 12 billion. Critical success factors for conducting policy reviews are, for example, (political) timing, involvement of independent experts (from the start) and commitment by senior staff.
Notes
1. In the Netherlands there is a detailed multi-year budget. For every line item (and even sub-items), multi-year estimates are made (in contrast to multi-year estimates for instances for the total expenditures). For every line item, line/ spending departments have to make a multi-year forecast. There are about 200 line items, but forecasts are also made for sub-line items (a rather detailed exercise). The forecasts are made by the line/spending departments.
2. A description of the decentralised Dutch financial management system is given in the Annex.
3. The Cabinet in the Netherlands is formed by a multi-party coalition. See also the Annex.
4. Each ministry has one budget. Each ministry has an average of ten budget lines per budget that are worked out systematically. Almost everywhere it was possible to categorise policy, performance and financial details systematically in a single policy line. A budget line is accompanied by one "general goal or objective" which can be subdivided into "operational goals". The spending/line ministry is responsible for its own budget and report. Line ministries are responsible for the programming and content/quality of their evaluations.
5. First-level legislation includes, for example, the Government Account Act (GAA). The GAA describes the main responsibilities (Ministry of Finance, spending ministries, Court of Audit) and timeframes of the budget process. The use of secondary legislation is for more detailed procedures and (time) formats for the budgets and reports.
6. About half of the goals are accompanied by quantitative performance indicators (see Ministry of Finance, 2004) . Budget based on trend-based economic assumptions (e.g. growth).
ANNEX
Characteristics of the Dutch Budget Process
One main decision moment on the new budget in the spring of each year.
The Dutch budgetary system is unique in several respects. The International Monetary Fund characterised the transparency of the Dutch budgetary system as "best practice" (IMF, 2006) . The main elements are: 1) the good structure and openness of the budget process; 2) the integrity and (political) independence of the Court of Audit, the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) and Statistics Netherlands (CBS); and 3) a trend-based fiscal framework which establishes political agreement over expenditure ceilings and macroeconomic constraints.
Especially noteworthy is the reliability of the budget framework because of broad political commitment. At the same time the budget is flexible enough to withstand a change in political priorities. Essential in the budget framework is the so-called coalition agreement. Because no political party enjoys a majority in Parliament, it is necessary to form a multi-party coalition. In the Netherlands, minority cabinets are rather the exception. The new policy programme includes increased spending on social policies and the environment, and a softer stance on immigration. The government will invest EUR 7 billion primarily in education, the environment, child care and health, and cut taxes by EUR 3 billion. Its plans assume 2% annual economic growth, and the programme contains an explicit goal for the EMU balance in 2011 (1% surplus), the fiscal rules and an overview of all the extra expenditures.
The "new 2007" coalition agreement "Working together, living together" is built around six "pillars". One minister is appointed for the co-ordination of all the policy measures under a single pillar:
• An active and constructive position of the Netherlands in Europe and the world.
• An innovative, competitive and entrepreneurial economy.
• A sustainable environment.
• Social coherence.
• Safety, stability and respect.
• The government as partner and helpful public sector.
Each pillar contains several policy measures and goals. For example, Pillar 4 involves increasing the number of houses built to a level between 80 000 and 100 000 each year (with involvement of the housing corporate body) and an end to the problems of disadvantaged inner city neighbourhoods within ten years. Pillar 5 aims to reduce crime by 25% by 2011 (related to 2003) . In addition to these measures, there is a detailed paragraph about the financial framework.
The coalition agreement also provides key elements on budget policy. A paragraph states that the agreement is based on trend-based economic assumptions, a split between government revenues and expenditures, details on the planned expenditures (ceiling) of the three budget sectors (state sector, social security and health care), and extensive rules for dealing with windfalls and setbacks (fiscal rules). The Annex in the agreement underlines the commitment of Dutch politicians to budget control. Even the opposition parties respect the fiscal rules; for example, a proposition of a party to increase expenditure in one policy area is always accompanied by a proposal to decrease expenditures in another policy area.
The main element is the decentralised approach. Each line/spending ministry is responsible for its budget line. Every spending department has a financial-economic directorate which is responsible for the expenditures of a department. 1 This means that this directorate draws up the budget for a ministry. The minister of the department presents his/her own budget in Parliament, defends this budget and is responsible for the budget execution. The political decisions on the budget are made by the cabinet, and the Minister of Finance is responsible for the total budget.
The financial-economic directorates are responsible for sound financial data: accounting and information regarding the budget cycle (budget proposal, execution and reporting) of each ministry. In practice, they form a "spring hinge" between the policy directorates of a line ministry and the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for macro control of the budget and, in retrospect, the account/report. Almost 1 200 full-time equivalents are in the control divisions. They use 46% of their time for accounting. Administration is one of the building blocks for good financial control (see Box A.3).
In the financial control division of each ministry, around 10-15% of the staff is available for policy control. Policy control can be used for the improvement of efficiency and the efficiency of policy programmes, for example the check of policy letters on financial consequences and multiannual estimations. Around 2% of the staff is available for policy evaluations. The control division concentrates on the programming (and stimulation) of good quality evaluations. Policy divisions, consultants or separate "evaluation divisions" execute the programmed evaluation. The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), for example, is an independent research institute with respect to content and has its own independent external advisory body. The CPB is an integral and well-supported part of the policymaking process. For example, the CPB evaluates the economic policies of the government and the political parties, but also executes cost-benefit analysis for big infrastructure projects (high-speed link).
Around 13-18% of the available time in the control division is used for budget cycle activities. The budget cycle is typified by numerous fixed procedures and actions. These have their basis in the Constitution, the Government Account Act and second-level legislation. The fiscal year starts on 1 January and ends on 31 December. The budget is introduced on the third Tuesday in September (Budget Day, see Box A.4). On this day the Minister of Finance introduces the budget memorandum and budget bills to the Lower House. The Minister of Finance is responsible for the budget memorandum 2 but the line ministers are responsible for the budget bills (autonomy). Budget bills are operated on an integrated obligation cash system. 
